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The facts of [Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders] are outrageous.1
– New York Times Editorial Board
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the firm has long served as the foundational molecule of the U.S. capitalist
economy,2 theories of the firm have for more than a century dominated legal and
economic discourse.3 Ever since Ronald Coase published The Nature of the Firm in 1937
and asked why firms should exist in an efficient market, 4 classicists and neoclassicists
have competed to develop theories—predominantly managerialist5 and contractual6—
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago–Kent College of Law. I thank Alison LaCroix, Todd Henderson, Tamar
Frankel, Jim Cox, Lyman Johnson, Don Langevoort, and Manning Warren, as well as the participants in
roundtables on investment funds at Boston University School of Law and workshops at the University of Iowa
College of Law and Chicago–Kent College of Law. I am also grateful to Robert Ennesser and Claire Willis for
their research assistance. Portions of this Article are based on my blog postings and an amicus brief I wrote on
behalf of law professors in support of the respondent in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders.
1. Editorial, So No One’s Responsible: If Mutual Funds Want to Lie, The Supreme Court’s
Conservatives Have Given Them a Way to Do It, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A26.
2. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1 (1986) (setting forth his postulate that the division of
labor—and therefore the firm—serves as the central analytical unit in a market).
3. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J.
499, 529–40 (2011) (explicating the development of theories of the firm in neoclassical and new institutional
paradigms); see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1989) (noting the placement of theories of the firm in the corporate
law discussion).
4. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937).
5. Managerialist theories of the firm generally conceive of the firm as a hierarchical structure dominated
by managerial power. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 62–65 (1976)

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175218
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that best explain the structure and behavior of business organizations. Those theories, in
turn, provide support to competing sides in the adjudication of important public policy
decisions, such as the propriety of allowing corporations to make independent
expenditures on behalf of political campaigns in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.7
The investment fund, by contrast, has languished at the margins of corporate theory,
relegated as simply a minor, if somewhat curious, example of the firm. But as the flow of
assets into funds has swollen dramatically in recent years, 8 so too has the relevance of the
question whether funds are, in fact, best considered a subspecies of the firm or instead
ought to be evaluated as independent phenomena. Mutual funds now hold more than $12
trillion in assets under management,9 a figure expected to rise considerably as private and
public employers rapidly shed their pension plans.10 With corporate and governmental
budgets buckling under the strain of promises to pay indefinite annuities and everincreasing health care premiums, one widespread solution has been to shift the
responsibility of investing from employers to employees.11 Those individuals, in turn,
primarily select funds as their vehicle of choice for investing for their future retirement,
healthcare, and education.12
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rise in the use of funds has brought with it a
concomitant increase in fund-related litigation.13 After more than a quarter century of

(tracing the breakdown in contractual consent to the breakdown of corporate controls); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.,
THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 32–39 (1954).
6. Contractual theories of the firm generally conceive of the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus
of contracts among discrete elements of production. See, e.g., Edward Iacobucci & George G. Triantis,
Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 515 (2007) (explaining the emergence of
theories of the firm); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (noting that the notion of legal fiction
is not limited to firms); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 316, 320–24 (1973) (examining hierarchies that emerge from internal organization).
7. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881 (2010) (implicitly endorsing a
contractual theory of the firm); id. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing instead
for a concession theory of corporations).
8. See INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 128 tbl.1 (51st ed. 2011) [hereinafter
ICI FACT BOOK], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf (showing the massive increase in total
net assets held by mutual funds over the past 70 years).
9. See id. (listing total net assets of all U.S. mutual funds as $11.8 trillion as of 2010).
10. See, e.g., THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDED STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010), available at http://downloads
.pewcenteronthestates.org/The_Trillion_Dollar_Gap_final.pdf (describing the large number of states with
struggling or failing pension plans).
11. See id. at 10 (discussing various states’ efforts to implement risk sharing pension plans); see also
James Dao, Does Debt Bill “Gut” Military? Depends Whom You Ask, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, http://atwar
.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/does-debt-bill-gut-military-depends-whom-you-ask/ (discussing an “internal
Pentagon panel” that “has proposed revamping military retirement benefits,” such as by converting the existing
pension plan to a defined contribution plan).
12. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 105 (referencing Figure 7.7, which illustrates the widespread use
of mutual funds in the asset allocations of 401(k) plans).
13. See generally John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L.J. 84 (2011) (discussing the breadth of mutual fund
litigation, particularly under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940).
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declining to grant certiorari in any cases involving mutual funds, 14 the Supreme Court
has heard and ruled upon two notable fund disputes in the past two Terms. In the October
2009 Term, the Court in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.15 reaffirmed—with minor
alterations—a fiduciary standard for excessive fees under which no plaintiff has ever
been able to prevail at trial.16 Then, in the October 2010 Term, the Court ruled in Janus
Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders17 that a fund advisor is not liable for fraud in
the prospectus of one of the advisor’s funds because the advisor is not the “maker” of
those statements, notwithstanding the fact that the advisor forms and incubates the fund,
furnishes all management to the fund, drafts and publishes the fund’s prospectuses, and
perpetrates the fraudulent scheme. 18
In both these decisions, the ruling justices applied a neoclassical conception of the
firm in their analysis of the business operations and legal issues of investment funds.19
Perhaps more surprising, however, was the justices’ admitted lack of comprehension and
facility regarding funds, which was revealed at oral argument in Janus. Justice Stephen
Breyer at one point said to an advocate, “No, you have to explain it to me more. I’m not
being difficult. I understand this less well than you think I do, and I want to know.” 20
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, inquiring about the structure of funds, asked what it means for
them to be formed as entities distinct from advisors. 21 Then, with oral argument almost
concluded after an hour-long discussion, Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg inquired about recovery for shareholders in the fund itself, 22 which seemed to
surprise the oral advocate and much of the audience because the case concerned recovery
only for shareholders in the fund’s advisor—an entirely different and unrelated group of
investors.
Though the justices may be proficient with the direct relationship between firms and
their shareholders, that simple dyad is increasingly being exploded by the interposition of
14. Previously, the most recent Supreme Court case involving a mutual fund was Daily Income Fund v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
15. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1420 (2010).
16. For a discussion of this decision, see generally William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A
Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 (2010).
17. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2297–98 (2011). For academic
commentary on this ruling, see generally EDWARD PEKAREK & GENAVIEVE SHINGLE, THE MAKE BELIEVE OF
JANUS—A BRIEF CASE COMMENT EXAMINING JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. FIRST DERIVATIVE (N.Y. State Bar
Ass’n Sec. Litig. & Arbitration) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942748; Norman S.
Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 252,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946465. For a discussion of the Janus decision, see Michael S.
Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme Court Shrugs, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 15, 27–29 (2011); Joseph A. Franco, Of
Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1, 53 (2011).
18. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302–04.
19. See id. at 2299 (“Although JCG created Janus Investment Fund, Janus Investment Fund is a separate
legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors.”); Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (identifying “scrutiny of
investment advisor compensation by a fully informed mutual fund board” as the “cornerstone . . . of the effort to
control conflicts of interest within mutual funds” (internal citations omitted)).
20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct.
2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09525.pdf.
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 62–64.
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financial intermediaries. Today, hedge funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, and
similarly managed investment vehicles dominate the global economic playing field
through their possession of both huge amounts of money and powerful systemic risk. 23 In
a recent analysis of the rise of intermediated financial investments, Professor Jill Fisch
pointed out that institutional (primarily fund) investors now own “an unprecedented
76.4% of the largest 1000 corporations.”24 And by many accounts, the U.S. economy
suffered distress at the hands of systemic risk exacerbated by highly leveraged hedge
funds during the 2008 financial crisis and then teetered towards greatest jeopardy in
September of that year with the breaking of the buck in money market funds. 25
Yet funds sit uncomfortably within the neoclassical theoretical framework of
business firms, which posits that any potential managerial power is counterbalanced by
interlocking systems of market discipline. First, the robust set of mechanisms that
discipline the behavior of firm managers—such as markets for corporate control, labor,
and products—are notably absent or diminished in the context of investment funds.26
Second, unlike shareholders in firms, the shareholders of funds experience a rigidly
intermediated relationship with their investments. Third, because of the wholesale shift
from defined benefit pensions to defined contribution plans by both corporate and
governmental employers, many fund shareholders have come to hold their investments
involuntarily.27
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s recent opinions concerning funds are overly
formalistic, contradict the functional realities of investment funds, and rely upon
unsatisfying theoretical paradigms. The question thus arises: what is the Supreme Court’s
theory of the fund? Moreover, is that theory grounded in an accurate understanding of the
nature and operation of investment funds? The answers to these questions, combined with
normative critiques and counterarguments, might provide coherence to a growing body of
jurisprudence that is sure to be tested further in the decades ahead. As more Americans
come to use and to rely upon investment funds for their direct financial welfare now as
well as their future retirement, more litigation and regulation is sure to follow. The

23. See Rebecca Christie & Ian Katz, Hedge Funds May Pose Systemic Risk in Crisis, U.S. Report Says,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/hedge-funds-may-pose-systemicrisk-in-crisis-u-s-report-says.html (describing a confidential report by staff of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council, which identified the systemic risk posed by private equity firms, money market funds, and hedge
funds).
24. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963
(2010).
25. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM
OPTIONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/10.21%20PWG
%20Report%20Final.pdf (identifying the inability of certain money market funds to repay their investors 100
cents on each dollar invested, which triggered a run on such funds, as one of “several key events during the
financial crisis” that “underscored the vulnerability of the financial system to systemic risk”).
26. See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017,
1031–32 (2005).
27. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-118, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS: KEY
INFORMATION ON TARGET DATE FUNDS AS DEFAULT INVESTMENTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO PLAN SPONSORS
AND PARTICIPANTS (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11118.pdf; see also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 106–11 (2008)
(discussing poor saving habits and automatic enrollments made without the explicit consent of shareholders).
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moment to test the soundness of this intellectual framework is before greater weight is
balanced upon it.
Part II of this Article discusses the shortcomings of the recent ruling in Janus
Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, taking particular exception with the
remarkable formalism of the majority’s reasoning, which appears to ignore or
misapprehend the actual operations of mutual funds. If operating companies follow the
lead of investment funds and use Janus as a model for immunity against securities
litigation, deterrence of financial fraud is likely to drop substantially. Part III considers
the potentially deleterious implications of the Court’s fund jurisprudence and predicts
that substantial mischief will flow from the decision should its lessons be taken
advantage of in other sectors of the economy. Part IV considers the theoretical lens—the
theory of the fund—that justices of the Supreme Court appear to use to examine
investment funds, and it identifies mistaken assumptions and problems with that lens and
its use in the pair of recent rulings in Janus and Jones v. Harris. This Article considers
whether alternative theories of the firm might inform a more useful theory of the fund for
both the judicial and legislative branches in the future.
II. FORMALISM & DAMAGE IN THE JANUS RULING
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus is, in the words of Professor Jeffrey Gordon,
“one of those cases that takes your breath away.” 28 In this 5–4 decision, Justice Clarence
Thomas held that an investment advisor cannot be held liable for fraudulent statements in
the prospectus of one of the advisor’s investment funds. 29 Although the advisor formed,
incubated, operated, and managed the fund, and drafted and filed the prospectus in
question, the Court nevertheless ruled that the advisor did not “make” the fraudulent
statement.30 Indeed, the Court was untroubled by the uncontested allegation that the
advisor was wholly responsible for the fraud because it permitted market-timing arbitrage
in its funds after filing a prospectus that explicitly banned that activity. 31 Instead, the
Court ruled that the maker of the statement is the fund itself, a distinct legal entity with
“ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”32
Nice legal formalities such as this are not new in the world of corporate law and
their bright lines are often intended to sacrifice a modicum of equity for the comforts of
predictability. But several problems exist with respect to the doctrinal reasoning itself in
Janus. Perhaps more importantly, because formalities also tend to encourage highly
strategic behavior, the implications of the Janus ruling threaten significant and broader
damage in the future, both in the world of funds and the greater economy.

28. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Only the Supreme Court Can “Make” a Tree, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (June 29, 2011), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capitalgroup-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-“make”-a-tree/.
29. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2300, 2306.
32. Id. at 2302.
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A. The Majority’s Reasoning in Janus
The facts in Janus arose from allegations made by prosecutors in 2003 that several
mutual fund complexes permitted market timing in their funds, in violation of express
restrictions against such behavior published in those funds’ public securities filings.33 As
a general concept, market timing is simply the practice of attempting to execute
investment decisions to benefit from positive market developments or to avoid
deleterious ones—certainly a very widespread phenomenon in the investment world and
not at all legally suspect.34 But in this particular context, the term has a more precise and
somewhat more pernicious valence.35
An investment advisor orchestrates a market-timing ruse first by attracting
individual, long-term, buy-and-hold investors to its funds with the promise of safety—
that is, an explicit policy barring market timing. 36 The market timers are sophisticated
institutional traders, such as hedge-fund traders, who move large sums of money rapidly
in and out of mutual funds to arbitrage the unusual pricing system of those funds. 37 The
fact that mutual funds are priced only once a day rather than continuously creates this
opportunity for exploiting economic developments occurring around the world. Again,
the practice is not illegal, but rapid trades in and out of a mutual fund can dilute the
returns of long-term investors and drive up transaction costs for the entire fund. For that
reason, many advisors of mutual funds voluntarily impose their own bans on market
timing.38 Janus Capital Management, as advisor to the Janus funds, promulgated and
published such a ban in the prospectus to the Janus funds. The plaintiffs in the Janus
litigation contended that Janus subsequently entered into profitable, undisclosed
arrangements with certain hedge funds to permit market timing.39 Throughout the
entirety of these dealings, the investment advisor collected fees from both the winners
and losers of the market timing. 40 This allegation of fraud was at the root of the dispute
in Janus.41
An illustrative case of market timing involves time-zone arbitrage.42 Because
mutual fund shares are priced only once a day, usually just after the primary stock
markets close at 4:00 p.m. Eastern, the accuracy of those prices quickly deteriorates.
Subsequent events on the other side of the world may move the price of securities of

33. Id. at 2300.
34. See generally Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds:
Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006) (examining the intricacies of market timing
practices).
35. See id. at 236 (defining market timing).
36. See id.
37. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual
Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1453 (2006) (discussing market timing and providing an example of it).
38. See id. at 1453 (noting incentives for advisors to impose their own ban on market timing).
39. See Consolidated Amended Fund Derivative Complaint at 14–16, In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. et al.,
No. 04-md-15863 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2004), 2004 WL 2630907.
40. See id.
41. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) (explaining
allegations of misrepresentation).
42. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 662–65 (2010) (outlining the problems time-zone arbitrage
raises).
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foreign companies. Thus, the actual net asset value of any U.S. mutual fund holding those
foreign securities in its portfolio will fluctuate even before the fund’s shares are re-priced
the next day. During those periods when a fund’s price and its value no longer
correspond, a sophisticated market timer can arbitrage the difference by moving large
sums of cash into (to realize gains) or out of (to avoid losses) the fund. Of course, the
market timer’s gains are necessarily other investors’ losses:
By moving large blocks of cash into a fund in anticipation of a rise in the
fund’s value, the market timer dilutes the worth of each individual share of the
fund. Although the timer’s new cash was not invested in the underlying
securities whose value has risen, the investment has increased the number of
fund shares outstanding. Thus, with a greater denominator, the [Net Asset
Value] pricing equation results in profits from positive market movements
being shared by a greater number of shareholders. 43
In addition to dilution, market timing generates material transaction costs for a fund and
thus for each of the fund’s shareholders. The quick inflow and outflow of large sums of
money creates inefficiencies in the management of the fund as portfolio managers must
accommodate large redemptions by either maintaining greater liquidity cushions (which
are likely to impose drag upon fund returns) or by executing unanticipated trades to
liquidate portfolio holdings (which increase fund fees). 44
Investment managers are, of course, well aware of these costs and, accordingly,
demand compensation from the market timers.
In exchange for the ability to move $25 million rapidly in and out of a
particular fund, for instance, a market timer might offer to leave untouched $50
million of “sticky” assets in a different fund in the advisor’s complex. Such an
arrangement, of course, pits the interests of the shareholders of the timed fund
against those of the shareholders in the fund with sticky assets.45
If we assume that an allegation of market-timing fraud is true, then the investment
advisor has masterminded an intricate deception against two different groups of investors
simultaneously: the long-term purchasers of shares in the advisor’s mutual funds who are
vulnerable to market timing, as well as the holders of equity in the advisor itself. This
second population of investors defrauded by the scheme—which would include the
plaintiffs in Janus—comprises the advisor’s equity holders who invest in the advisor in
reliance upon public assurances that the advisor disallows market timing in the funds that
it manages and from whom the advisor generates its primary profits. When allegations of
advisors’ complicity in market timing came to light in 2003, those investors suffered the
greatest collapse in their investments as stock prices in advisors such as Janus plummeted
by more than 20% in just a few weeks. 46

43. Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455.
44. See id. at 1455–56 (outlining these steps managers must take).
45. Id. at 1456.
46. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas, Marketplace; Janus Capital Meets the Enemy and It Is Janus, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/13/business/market-place-janus-capitalmeets-the-enemy-and-it-is-janus.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting that Janus Capital lost “more than 20
percent of the market value of its shares in recent weeks”).

778

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Vol. 37:4

For certain theoretical objections, the precise nature of the underlying fraud alleged
might be of little relevance to the Court’s analysis in Janus, but the far-reaching
mechanics of market timing reveal the central role that investment advisors play in both
operating mutual funds and engineering this particular violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). To accommodate institutional market
timers, an investment advisor needs—and indeed arrogates for itself—control over all
aspects of mutual fund operations: the advisor advertises its funds to new purchasers
through an affiliated distributor (which is the fund equivalent of an underwriter); the
advisor determines the policies that govern those funds and publicizes them in fund
prospectuses that its attorneys write and publicly file; the advisor monitors trading
activity in the shares of its funds through an affiliated transfer agent or administrator
responsible for back-office infrastructure; and the advisor negotiates special
arrangements for favored clients such as hedge funds who engage in the actual market
timing.47 In sum, to engineer a practice of market timing, an investment advisor must
coordinate all major aspects and operations of a mutual fund.
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 prohibits “mak[ing] any untrue
statement of material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 48 The
petitioners in Janus sought a novel exception from liability under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act for investment managers who manipulate or deceive their shareholders. 49
So long as those advisors conduct their activities through a distinct business trust,
petitioners contended, such defendants ought to be impervious to lawsuits brought by
shareholders. To succeed upon this theory—and thereby to immunize fund advisors—the
Janus petitioners had to persuade the Supreme Court to accept two dubious contentions:
(1) lifeless funds created and controlled by advisors enjoy meaningful independent
existence; and (2) advisors are simply minions of those funds. In each case, the opposite
is far closer to the truth. But, in Janus, the Court did indeed adopt those two arguments as
premises for its ruling.50
Janus argued—and the Court agreed—that investment advisors should not be liable
for any such violations of section 10(b).51 One of the most troubling and perverse
consequences of this ruling is that the investors can now never recover, even though no
one disputes that they were defrauded. Janus persuaded the district court at trial that the
plaintiffs cannot recover from the funds, because those entities are empty shells with “no
assets separate and apart from those they hold for shareholders”;52 nor can they recover
from the advisors, as Janus asserted successfully before the Supreme Court, 53 because
any false and misleading statements were made solely by the funds, which Janus insisted
are autonomous entities.

47. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS §§ 12, 21–22, 27, 32 (2d ed. 2001).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, No. 09-525 (4th
Cir. Oct. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 3614467.
50. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304–05 (2011).
51. Id. at 2299.
52. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 n.3 (D. Md. 2005).
53. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 3501188.
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The scope of this heads-I-win-tails-you-lose theory may, in the immediate aftermath
of Janus, apply only to the unique structure of mutual funds, but the Court’s endorsement
may well furnish a blueprint for more widespread impunity from securities violations. 54
A corporation that publicly claims to police the quality of its products while soliciting
douceurs that jeopardize that quality—as may occur with market timing, tainted
medication, or faulty tires—has received a tutorial on how to evade legal liability.
Following the Janus example, such corporations would need only to replicate the
structure of mutual funds by forming “another,” 55 “different,”56 and judgment-proof
entity to furnish—via contract rather than internal employment—all management
functions externally.57 Indeed, dozens of defendants in federal cases have already
invoked Janus to immunize their alleged wrongdoings, and the courts have largely been
receptive.58
The Supreme Court could have avoided such a result while also maintaining
doctrinal consistency, by instead applying the principles of duty and proximity set forth
in prominent and recent decisions such as Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.59 The vital holding of Stoneridge was that liability turns on
concrete connections between the defendants, the plaintiffs, and the fraud—such as those
between investment advisors, their shareholders, and market timing—not upon stagemanaged formalisms.60 The justices therefore have a more finely tuned and arguably
more sophisticated analytical instrument in their toolbox than the categorical formalism
of the majority’s opinion in Janus would suggest.
1. Control
The federal judicial, legislative, and executive branches have each recognized that
managers exert an extraordinary degree of control over their funds. This dominance
54. Senator Patrick Leahy characterized the decision as giving corporations a “license to lie” and a
“roadmap for fraud.” See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the Constitution
and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1217 (2011) (citing Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How
the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing on Corporate Behavior] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)).
55. Hearing on Corporate Behavior, supra note 54, at 8.
56. Id. at 9.
57. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Taub, Will Bad Funds Make Good Law?: Janus v. First Derivative Traders Part
VIII, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Jan. 15, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securitiesissues/will-bad-funds-make-good-law-janus-v-first-derivative-trader-7.html (speculating about possible
collateral effects of such a ruling beyond the world of investment funds).
58. See, e.g., Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 694 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
insufficiency of [plaintiff’s] pleadings are reinforced by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Janus . . . which
sets the pleading bar even higher in private securities fraud actions seeking to hold defendants primarily liable
for the misstatements of others.”); In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 4712206, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
6, 2011) (“While the Supreme Court in Janus considered whether a business entity could be held liable for a
prospectus issued by a separate entity, its analysis applies equally to whether Kaplan, Rench, and Smith may be
held liable for the misstatements of their co-defendants.”).
59. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152 (2008) (explaining
that in order to be liable under section 10(b) there must have been a duty to disclose, and if this duty is
breached, the plaintiff-investor must show a detrimental reliance).
60. Id.
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stands in marked contrast to the arm’s-length relationship of business arrangements in
other segments of the economy and, of course, to the characterization by Janus in this
case of managers as merely distant and subservient third parties.
The Supreme Court addressed the topic of mutual funds just one year before Janus
in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,61 when it noted that it is “typical” for a fund manager
to “create[] the mutual fund,” “select[] the fund’s directors, manage[] the fund’s
investments, and provide[] other services.” In its previous rulings concerning mutual
funds, the Court also remarked on the unusual proximity of managers to their funds. 62
Also, in perhaps the most well-known federal decision on mutual funds, the Second
Circuit noted that Congress “recognized . . . the potentially incestuous relationships
between many advisors and their funds.”63
The congressional recognition to which the Second Circuit referred exists in a
United States Senate Report accompanying the passage of the Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1970.64 The report noted “the unique structure of this industry” in
which funds are typically “formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, that are
separately owned and operated”; that managers “select the funds’ investments and
operate their businesses,” and provide “almost all management services”; and therefore,
“a mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the advisor.” 65
In the executive branch, the Securities and Exchange Commission has on several
occasions reiterated the domination of funds by their advisors. For instance, the SEC
stated that “the term ‘investment advisor’ is to some extent a misnomer” because “[t]he
so-called ‘advisor’ is no mere consultant. He is the fund’s manager. Hence the investment
advisor almost always controls the fund.” 66
Indeed, even the advisors’ own trade association, the Investment Company Institute,
has in Supreme Court pleadings acknowledged the extensive degree to which managers
run their funds, prepare fund prospectuses, and incur consequent liability: “Mutual fund
advisors . . . prepare prospectuses, shareholder reports and other disclosures for which
they have liability under the securities laws.” 67 The advisor in the Janus litigation
nevertheless insisted that investment advisors are, as a categorical matter, only
“secondary actors” and that any of their alleged malfeasance was therefore too attenuated
to trigger legal liability.68 Having begged the central question of the dispute in this case
by labeling themselves taxonomically too remote to be held liable, Janus then concluded
at each step in their fraud-on-the-market analysis that they were in fact too remote to be
held liable.
Yet, as evidence of their self-asserted inviolable status, Janus proffered an array of
61. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010).
62. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984) (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
481 (1979)) (noting that mutual funds are “typically created and managed by a pre-existing external
organization known as an investment advisor”).
63. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929–30 (1982).
64. See generally S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897.
65. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928; S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 4 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4901.
66. In re Steadman Sec. Corp., 46 S.E.C. 896, 920 n.81 (1977) (citations omitted).
67. See Brief for The Investment Co. Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586).
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 15–21.
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formalities, which the Court ultimately and surprisingly chose to adopt. Central to this
argument is the contention that investment managers are merely subaltern “service
providers” orbiting funds at great distance, tethered only by the flimsiest thread of
contract. Very much to the contrary, investment managers are prime movers who reign
from the center of the mutual fund universe. In the beginning, managers create, incubate,
and hold their funds as wholly owned subsidiaries.69 During this genesis, when the
advisor is the sole shareholder and investor in a fund, the advisor and the fund enter into
the advisory agreement—which the Court relied upon as evidence of independence—
whose two signatories are both under the control of a single entity: the advisor.70
2. To “Make” a Statement
One of the more interesting aspects of the majority and dissenting opinions in Janus
was their dispute over the definition of “to make,” 71 which was central to their
interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against the making of any material
misstatement or omission.72 Indeed, one wit compared the Court to the Council of Nicaea
and the arguments to the Arian controversy in fourth century Christianity.73
The Fourth Circuit, whose decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in this case,
concluded that Janus made the alleged misstatements and that plaintiff–shareholders
relied to their detriment upon those statements because of the dominant role of
investment managers.74 In both Stoneridge and Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,75 the Supreme Court chose not to confine section 10(b)
liability to the entity to which a public misrepresentation is expressly attributed.76 To
issue such a categorical rule would have been to invite game playing in categorization,
the majority reasoned, whereby perpetrators could escape liability merely by interposing
separate but subservient entities between themselves and their fraud. 77 The facts of Janus
turned out to be an illustration of the very circumstances understood but unruled upon in
Stoneridge, in which one entity could so dominate another that it ought to be recognized
to have made the relevant misrepresentations and therefore to be held liable as a primary
violator.78
The industry practice in mutual funds supports the contention that the fund advisor
“wrote and represented its policy against market timers”; 79 that it “publicly issu[ed] false
69. See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1423–24 (noting that managers sustain funds on “life support” by
externally providing all fund management).
70. See generally FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 47, § 12.
71. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 2306 (2011).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
73. See Keith Paul Bishop, A Modern Council of Nicaea—Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Janus
Today, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.calcorporatelaw.com/
2010/12/a-modern-council-of-nicaea-supreme-court-hears-oral-arguments-in-janus-today.
74. See In re Mut. Funds. Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 122, 127 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing the Stoneridge and
Central Bank cases in support of its holding).
75. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 165 (1994);
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific–Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156 (2008).
76. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166–67.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 162.
79. Joint Appendix at *72a, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)
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and misleading statements” concerning that policy;80 and that petitioners “caused mutual
fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the
investing public, which created the misleading impression that [petitioners] would
implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus Funds.”81 Based upon this
analysis, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[t]hese statements, taken together, allege that
[Janus], by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the
misleading statements contained in the documents.”82
Indeed, investment managers of mutual funds satisfy each of the Stoneridge criteria
that mere aiders and abettors or other secondary actors cannot. 83 First, investment
managers clearly owe a duty to disclose their true management policies to their own
shareholders, whereas Scientific–Atlanta and Motorola owed nothing of the kind to the
plaintiff–shareholders of Charter Communications.84 Second, managers play a central
role in preparing and disseminating public disclosures for their funds, whereas the
defendants in Stoneridge had no involvement with Charter’s financial statements.85
Third, fraud of the sort alleged in this case centers upon “the realm of financing
business,” and thereby triggers the strictures of section 10(b) for any perpetrators, unlike
the dealings in Stoneridge, which occurred only within the “realm of ordinary business
operations.”86
The trial record amply demonstrated that Janus effectively merged the existence of
the funds into their own: regarding control of “business affairs,”87 officers (all seventeen
officers of the Janus funds were Janus Capital Management Vice Presidents), 88 office
space (provided by Janus Capital Management), 89 business address (shared by the funds,
Janus Capital Management, and Janus Capital Group),90 and even signature (the
prospectuses were signed simply by “Janus”).91
With the Supreme Court concluding that the investment advisor does not make the
statements, misleading or otherwise, published in a fund prospectus, one is left to wonder
who does. To answer that the fund makes such statements is to admit circuitously that the
advisor does so, inasmuch as the fund has no employees and its only officers are

(No. 90-525), 2010 WL 3501716.
80. Id. at *111a.
81. Id. at *63a.
82. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 180 L. Ed. 2d
166 (2011) (emphasis in the original).
83. For a discussion of secondary liability in the context of this ruling, see Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed
Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”: Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd–Frank Act, 49
HARV. J. LEG. 175, 183–86 (2012) (discussing secondary liability). See generally Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the
Third Time a Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under
Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2012) (discussing finding the balance between primary and
secondary actor liability).
84. Stoneridge Inv. Partners. v. Scientific–Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158–59 (2008).
85. Id. at 160–61.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Appendix at *143a, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 3501716.
88. Id. at *23a–24a.
89. Id. at *143a.
90. Id. at *165a.
91. Id. at *42a.
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employees of the manager, who pays their salaries. To answer instead that the Janus
fund’s board of trustees makes such statements is to misunderstand fundamentally the
process by which hundreds of pages of mandatory disclosure are created for each fund
every year, a production from which trustees are almost entirely absent. In fact, the
detailed and extensive content of fund disclosure is furnished almost exclusively by the
only entity who knows that information: the investment advisor actually operating the
fund.92 For all the inquiry into circumstances and definitions, Janus itself answered the
central question in this case: Janus Capital Management admitted in an interrogatory
asking who drafted the prospectuses that it was its own in-house attorneys, “Kelley
Howes, Bonnie Howe, and other members of JCM’s legal department,” who drafted the
prospectuses.93
In a particularly inapt analogy, the Court adopted the petitioners’ argument that the
giver of a speech, not the speechwriters, “makes” a speech. 94 No one familiar with the
operation of this industry would ever confuse a mutual fund for the giver of a speech. In
such a comparison, funds are far more akin to the microphone and speakers: necessary
instrumentalities that insentiently broadcast the principal’s message. The investment
manager, of course, is always the principal, writing and broadcasting the communications
of its funds. And courts have long since ceased to find inanimate objects guilty for the
wrongdoings of those who wield them. 95
3. Attribution
Although the Court did not reach the issue of reliance expressly, the 10b-5 doctrine
in this area illustrates further the discord and disruption of the Janus ruling. Whereas
Janus argued that putative plaintiffs cannot demonstrate reliance upon any misleading
statements in a prospectus unless the prospectus “directly attributed” those statements to
the manager,96 such a strict attribution rule would accord with neither the rationale of the
fraud-on-the-market theory itself nor the Court’s rulings in Stoneridge and Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.97 Indeed, such a rule would automatically eliminate the possibility of review
for a vast universe of fraud and, in so doing, render the Stoneridge inquiry into
remoteness and attenuation largely irrelevant. Without direct attribution, the courts would
dispose of cases prior to any Stoneridge analysis, whereas with direct attribution,
Stoneridge would almost necessarily be satisfied.98
Consider the numerous cases in which a corporate executive, for instance,
intentionally misleads a journalist or financial analyst, who in turn publishes highly

92. For a discussion of the definition of “make” in this case, see James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar:
The Supreme Court Turns Away Another Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 463–65 (2012).
93. Appendix, supra note 87, at *507a.
94. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
95. See Calero–Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (“Deodands did not
become part of the common-law tradition of this country.”).
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 53, at 11–12.
97. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (displaying a standard contrary to strict
attribution).
98. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and
Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2157–61 (2010).
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favorable reports without identifying the executive as a source. 99 Even in the absence of
direct attribution, the executive has nevertheless perpetrated a clear fraud on the market.
Courts have reasonably responded to such cases by finding the executive liable, yet
petitioners’ rule would overturn such decisions. 100 A strict attribution rule would
senselessly abort the sound analysis of Stoneridge and needlessly replace realism with
formalism. A better approach, and one more consistent with the Court’s approach in
Stoneridge, would instead inquire whether the executive engaged in a deceptive scheme
and, if so, whether that deception was sufficiently proximate to the statements upon
which investors relied.101
On the Janus facts, however, any notion of public attribution is readily satisfied.
Investment advisors themselves strive consciously to form a public connection between
themselves and their funds. When forming a new fund, the advisor typically selects a
name that blazons the advisor’s brand upon the new fund by incorporating the advisor’s
own name into the fund’s name. Hence, each of the putatively autonomous funds at issue
in this dispute featured “Janus” in its name. Investment advisors take direct and voluntary
measures to persuade the marketplace to attribute the performance of their funds to the
operations of their managers.
The marketplace, in turn, reasonably does so. Sophisticated investors familiar with
the structure and operation of mutual funds know that statements published by a mutual
fund flow from the will of its advisor. Less sophisticated investors unaware of any
separation between advisors and their funds are likely to assume that mutual fund shares
are simply products purchased directly from the manager. In both cases, the acts of funds
are widely attributed to their advisors. One wonders to whom else they could
meaningfully be attributed. Indeed, were an investment advisor to make an exculpatory
statement in a fund prospectus (rather than the incriminating one at issue in Janus), one
would fully expect the manager to argue that such statements sufficiently placed the
manager’s own investors on salutary notice. Indeed, as an empirical matter, the
marketplace demonstrated its widespread attribution of fund statements to investment
managers: upon the public allegation of market timing in mutual funds, stock prices of
the accused advisors fell rapidly, including more than 20% in Janus itself. 102
Had the Court endorsed Janus’s effort to substitute “express” for actual attribution in
this analysis, then a critical element of proving section 10(b) liability would have fallen
within the direct manipulation of perpetrators. As the government noted in its arguments
to the Court in Janus, to avoid liability, a violator would need only be discreet enough to
avoid speaking aloud what the marketplace already knows. 103 When the Court next
evaluates its 10b-5 doctrine, it should refrain from creating a unique exemption from

99. See id. at 2159 (identifying indirect methods of attribution that would avoid the strict attribution
standard).
100. See id. (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997); Freeland v. Iridium World
Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 74–76 (D.D.C. 2008)) (showing how executives can avoid liability under
strict attribution).
101. See Langevoort, supra note 98 (elaborating on how such an approach would operate).
102. See, e.g., Atlas, supra note 46 (stating that Janus Capital lost over 20% of its value in a matter of
weeks in 2003).
103. Brief for Respondent at 16, Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4253501.
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section 10(b) liability for investment managers or any future violators who are likely to
follow their example. Certainly, there are reasons for Congress and courts to be careful in
fashioning the scope of liability in securities class actions under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and many other commentators have
examined the problems of potential remedial overbreadth if shareholders are too readily
compensated in a system where securities fraud produces little, if any, net harm to
diversified investors.104
Yet even if accurate compensation did not entirely justify many securities class
action suits, effective deterrence does, and deterrence would be welcome in the mutual
fund advisory industry because of its recent track record. The past decade has seen
numerous revelations of fraud and other misconduct across many aspects of the mutual
fund advisory business beyond just market timing, such as late trading, unfair valuation,
and soft-dollar practices.105 When Congress limited the expansion of lawsuits with the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress did not choose—then or
since—to eliminate section 10(b) liability altogether. The liability that remains applies
squarely to the investment advisors of mutual funds that perpetrate market-timing frauds.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S RULING IN JANUS
The Supreme Court’s hostility to the implied private right of action under Rule 10b5 is well known, and its last three rulings in this field—Central Bank, Stoneridge, and
now Janus—each attempt to restrict that right without explicitly eliminating it and
thereby overruling the weighty precedent of Basic.106 Nevertheless, the Janus ruling does
more than merely narrow the scope of the right—it damages the very structure of private
deterrence of wrongdoing in the financial markets.
First, the decision appears to strain itself to find a way to immunize clear
perpetrators from accountability. One of the most troubling aspects of the Janus ruling is
that, even if one is willing to grant credence to the notion that the fund is endowed with
certain independence through its board of trustees, only the investment advisor is in a
position to run the business in accordance with—or in violation of—its prospectus. On
the facts of Janus, Janus drafted a prospectus that permitted no market timing, and then
Janus agreed to permit market timing. 107 Even if the board of trustees had furnished
oversight, which is a dubious proposition in an industry with famously weak board

104. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 611, 638–41 (1985) (considering aftermarket effects and potential remedies in securities cases); cf. Paul G.
Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 628–29 (1992)
(noting that Easterbrook and Fischel do not address the deterrent effect of social cost, such as where issuers are
forced to pay damages that are less than their net gains).
105. See, e.g., Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, B of A to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at C1;
Tom Lauricella, Alliance Offers Annual-Fee Cut as Part of Proposed Settlement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at
C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10710996418574900.html.
106. Professor James Cox invokes this trilogy of cases as authority for the “truism” that “corporations pay
and individual wrongdoers get a pass.” James D. Cox, Securities Class Actions as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 73, 83 n.35 (2011), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2011/Cox.pdf
(responding to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011)).
107. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 (2011).
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monitoring, nobody connected with the litigation made—or could seriously make—an
argument that the board provided any managerial functions to the funds. The ruling thus
turns a blind eye to “agency capitalism” 108—that is, the willingness of agents and
intermediaries to satisfy their own interests at the expense of their principals—at a time
when ever more investors are coming to rely upon these intermediaries for their financial
well-being. Indeed, in the diverse array of things that went wrong during the recent
financial crisis, one disturbing commonality in the poor performance of hedge funds,
ratings agencies, money market funds, and beyond was precisely this willingness of
gatekeepers to abdicate their duties to fiduciaries and others in favor of advancing their
own immediate pecuniary interests. Surely, in the wake of such financial peril, the
Supreme Court ought not provide immunity for such behavior.
Second, the formalistic nature of the ruling—both in its narrow-minded line drawing
and its willful disregard of the functional realities of investments funds—would appear to
encourage opportunistic game playing in the future. Surely, business firms will look at
this decision, note well the very favorable immunity that investment funds have just won
from the highest court in the land, and explore precisely how they might restructure their
own affairs to enjoy the same effects. 109 If Exxon Corporation, for example, created an
external management firm, shifted all current Exxon assets to a newly formed shell
company, and then provided all executive management of the business via contract
between those two entities, then could it not also limit its exposure to securities suits by
citing Janus? If so, then the ruling would be an effective overruling of Basic and a
judicial invalidation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Indeed, in just the
first handful of weeks and months following the Janus ruling, the lower federal courts
have already featured executives accused of malfeasance attempting to raise a “Janus”
defense pursuant to which they plead that it was their corporations, not themselves, who
made the allegedly fraudulent statements in dispute. 110
Third, the ruling is not likely to bring with it the boon of clarity that is often the
consoling virtue of highly formalistic, if somewhat inequitable, rulings. As Donald
Langevoort has noted, several situations already exist in which courts find parties who do
not have “ultimate authority” guilty for their wrongdoings: if an accountant admits to
having provided false financial statements for a corporation, for instance, or an executive
plants a false story about a corporation’s prospects to a news reporter, almost all courts
have found—and are likely to continue to find—such a defendant guilty of a Rule 10b-5
violation.111
108. See Gordon, supra note 28 (stating that the Janus decision “exacerbates the problem of ‘agency
capitalism’”).
109. Interestingly, this ruling may not be easy to characterize as merely a “pro-business” ruling by the
Roberts court. Donald Langevoort has pointed out that other securities cases in the same term did not result in
pro-business rulings. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities
Jurisprudence 1 (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 12-019, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010745. Indeed, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that Janus is an example not so much
of a pro-business ruling, but one of several in which the Supreme Court has evinced distrust of district courts.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375, 389 n.35 (2011); see also A.C.
Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 135–39 (2011)
(exploring the Janus opinion in contrast with other securities cases under the Roberts court).
110. See, e.g., SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
111. See Langevoort, supra note 109, at 1 (discussing the formalistic application of the Janus “ultimate
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In addition, the formalism for which corporate law may be well noted is often
permitted in circumstances quite unlike the facts of Janus. The typical formalism found
in corporate law appears, for instance, when it is statutorily authorized (as in the de facto
merger doctrine not applicable to the Janus facts) or restricted when fraud is involved (as
in veil piercing and in Janus),112 so the Court’s recent embrace of formalism does not fit
well within the existing corporate canon.
IV. THE COURT’S THEORY OF THE FUND
Beyond the specific contours of the Janus ruling, the decision in Jones v. Harris
sheds additional light upon the assumptions regarding the theoretical operations of
investment funds that the Supreme Court appears to be making in this body of
jurisprudence. In several instances at oral arguments and in their written opinions, the
justices appear to assume that mutual funds operate within the same structure of
competitive forces as conventional business firms. In doing so, they do not consider that
the efficient operation of those firms is premised in theory upon several dynamics that are
inapplicable to investment funds.
For instance, one of the arguments advanced by contractual theories of the firm in
opposition to their managerial counterparts is that managerial power is checked in a firm
by multiple independent layers of competing market forces: the markets for corporate
control, for labor, and for products.113 Those forces are notably absent in investment
funds. Investment funds also require shareholders to monitor both the underlying
portfolio investments as well as the behavior of their paid intermediary. In addition,
unlike typical firm shareholders, many of today’s investors in funds have not become
investors voluntarily, but instead have experienced an involuntary conversion as a result
of the elimination of their defined benefit plan.
A. Problems with the Court’s Theory of the Fund
The Supreme Court appears to be applying a conventional account of effective
corporate governance in non-fund entities—such as regular C corporations—to the highly
distinct milieu of investment funds. That standard account usually identifies and approves
of the interlocking effects of a variety of self-supporting dynamics.114 More specifically,
the discipline of short selling, incentive stock options, sophisticated shareholders,
efficient capital markets, and a market for corporate control, among other forces, are
thought to provide a positive reduction of agency costs upon corporate managers by
forcing them to maximize returns to their shareholders.115 What the Supreme Court does
not appear to consider thoughtfully, however, is the idea that such phenomena are largely
absent in the setting of investment funds and therefore the relevance of such a theoretical
authority” test).
112. Note, also, that although the formality of the corporate form is often upheld against petitions for veil
piercing, a common justification for that formalism is that other regimes—such as mandatory insurance—exist
to protect victims. No such regime exists under the facts of Janus.
113. Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1030–32, 1037.
114. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 50
(2008) (evaluating different corporate governance mechanisms).
115. See id.
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framework is substantially reduced.
In a particularly trenchant observation, Donald Langevoort has noted that several of
the most powerful of these devices are absent or impotent in the idiosyncratic
arrangement of investment funds:
Because mutual funds are not traded in an organized market, arbitrage
opportunities cannot work to keep prices in line with rational expectations.
Mutual fund prices are simply the product of net asset value at the time of
purchase or redemption. Insider compensation is largely based on assets as
well, which creates the conflict rather than aligns insider–shareholder interests,
and directors are typically paid all or mostly in cash. Institutional shareholder
voice does not exist in the fund area, and there is no external market for
corporate control at all because shareholders can only sell their shares back to
the fund.116
Langevoort thus arrives at the conclusion that any judicial attempts to rely
unthinkingly upon generic theories of corporate governance when considering the wholly
different nature of investment funds are highly problematic. “Thinking about mutual
funds by imagining them simply as a species of ‘corporations’ in a way that is directly
informed by contemporary corporate law theory is completely misguided,” he argues. 117
Inasmuch as so many of the conventional menu of governance protections are
missing, the only device that does remain to provide any sort of assistance to the
governance of investment funds is the possibility of shareholder redemption. 118 Again,
the standard corporate governance account posits that fund sponsors will be reined in
from governing their investment funds poorly (by extracting rents from their
shareholders, for example) because fund shareholders will punish such poor management
by exiting the fund through redemption of their shares or choosing not to invest in such
funds in the first place. This analysis, however, does not sufficiently countenance the fact
that investor exit is not just one of the only protections in mutual funds, but that in mutual
funds this protection is unusually weak and thus does not work as well as it might in the
usual setting for operating companies.
In a typical corporation (not an investment fund), sophisticated investors provide all
manner of ancillary, fall-out benefits to less sophisticated investors. Only wealthy and
powerful shareholders, for instance, have the capacity to launch proxy contests or other
competitions for corporate control, to engage in share price arbitrage via short-selling or
other financial strategies, or to launch expensive and time-consuming tender offers.
These tactics will benefit not only the shareholder who engages in them but also the
smaller, passive investors who also happen to hold those shares. With respect to the
116. Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1031–32.
117. Id.
118. The array of effective mechanisms that Jonathan Macey catalogs also includes initial public offerings
as a governance measure. See MACEY, supra note 114, at 127–29 (explaining the functionality and value of
initial public offerings). In the corporate context, IPOs may indeed involve “rigorous monitoring by a cadre of
lawyers, investment bankers, and financial analysts, all of whom face reputational and legal risks for failure to
do an adequate job of protecting investors.” Id. at 127. In mutual funds, however, the public offering process is
very different, as it is overseen primarily by the adviser and its affiliated distributor and is not shepherded by
investment banks. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 195. Nor are the funds rated by financial analysts in the
same manner as equity offerings.
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possibility of simply selling the investment to exit the company, however, the actions of a
sophisticated investor do not necessarily benefit the passivity of an unsophisticated
investor, unless a corporation is represented by a mixture of both sorts of investors
amongst its shareholders.119 If, indeed, the corporation in question does have a
shareholder base comprising both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, then the
corporation’s managers must always attempt to manage the enterprise in a way that will
benefit the most difficult to please. If such a dynamic were true in investment funds, for
instance, the fund sponsors would be obliged to run their funds in such a way as to keep
their largest institutional investors happy and invested in the fund, which would provide
benefits simultaneously to smaller and weaker investors. 120
Yet studies repeatedly show that in the investment fund industry, fund sponsors
work hard to segregate sophisticated and unsophisticated investors from one another such
that funds rarely have a heterogeneous mix of the two. Instead, fund sponsors provide
different investment products for those different kinds of investors and then separate
them from one another.121 Typically, the sophisticated investors demand and receive
distinct funds, which may be managed according to similar investment protocols but
come with far lower prices and other terms. 122 For less sophisticated investors in their
own funds, the only way that exit will work as an effective corporate governance device
is if those less sophisticated investors take action directly on their own behalf, 123 in
reliance upon the fund sponsor’s own disclosure. Yet evidence shows that less wealthy
and less sophisticated investors simply do not possess the ability to digest that disclosure
or to act upon it in an effective manner.
B. The Problems with Exit in Investment Funds
As so many of the Supreme Court’s assumed elements of corporate governance
theory are inapposite to investment funds, shareholder exit remains as the only possibly
viable one. When one considers how exit might—or might not—work in the context of
funds, one must begin to consider the theoretical elements that are similar regarding
corporate governance and markets for products.124
Investors in mutual funds are more technically described as shareholders, which of
course prompts an inquiry into the precise nature of the standard rights they enjoy as
equity and residuary owners. Yet, unlike so many other equity shareholders, their sole
mode of protection from deleterious anticompetitive tendencies in markets is their ability

119. See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455 (discussing market timing); Langevoort, supra note 98, at 1034
(citing Mahoney, supra note 104, at 168–69) (positing a “suspicion that the market for mutual funds is indeed
segmented into more and less sophisticated consumer groups, with funds (or even classes within the same fund)
with different quality attributes appealing to different segments”).
120. See Birdthistle, supra note 37, at 1455.
121. See id.
122. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 8, at 184.
123. For a discussion of the weaknesses of informational intermediaries and conflicts of brokers in the
mutual fund context, see Birdthistle, supra note 37. See also Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst
Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 1097–98 (2007) (discussing the conflicts of interests and questionable
independence of mutual fund analysts).
124. See Langevoort, supra note 98, at 1036–40 (discussing hypotheses of product market competition
ideologies).
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to redeem their fund shares, which raises the broader question of how best to characterize
such investors. Indeed, in the market for products, potential customers also are protected
almost solely by their ability and willingness to buy or to sell a product—the fear that
they will not buy or that they will sell provides some incentive for the producer of such
products to perform its task well.
This debate found voice in Jones v. Harris, when several judges at different stages
in the litigation bypassed the plaintiffs’ status as shareholders and instead reasoned that
they were primarily the purchasers of products and should, accordingly, enjoy fewer legal
protections. This curious rationale, however, rapidly eliminates many of the statutory
provisions that Congress enacted precisely to safeguard the interests of those kinds of
investors. Certain jurists, of course, might wonder why a mutual fund shareholder ought
to enjoy greater protections from another market participant who is merely a consumer of
products.
Of course, the most direct response is to point out that the structure of investment
funds is largely the result of Congressional regulation via the Investment Company Act
of 1940—thus, investors in investment funds are shareholders and not merely consumers
because Congress has willed it so.125 Thus, unless and until Congress alters its
legislation, courts are obliged to conduct their theoretical analyses of investment funds
within the system of corporate governance, even if that model does not apply with
satisfying relevance when contrasted with more conventional operating companies.
Certainly, as we have seen, the paradigm of governance in investment funds is
remarkably weaker than that of conventional corporations, not simply because funds
enjoy fewer devices that discipline fund managers, but also because the solitary device
they do enjoy—shareholder exit—works far less well in the context of investment funds.
When one recalls that much of this past decade has witnessed the once-heralded
mutual fund suffer from a regular series of investigations by prosecutors and lawsuits by
investors, one finds a litany of how vulnerable funds find themselves across their array of
operations: market timing, late trading, unfair valuation, 12b-1 fees, and so forth. 126 As
individuals find themselves beset with increasing responsibility for investing their own
retirement assets as pensions give way to defined contribution plans throughout the
public and private economies, there is no evidence that unsophisticated individuals have
the ability or the willingness to allocate their investments wisely. Studies demonstrate
repeatedly that large numbers of individuals do not enroll in their retirement plans, 127 or
that if they do, large percentages then fail to allocate those funds to anything beyond the
standard cash investment.128 And even when investors do enroll and do invest, they
appear to do so poorly, with little skill at the timing or risk of their investment decisions.

125. See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a180a-64).
126. See generally Birdthistle, supra note 37 (explaining the participants and mechanisms involved in the
mutual fund investment irregularities).
127. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior,
in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81–121 (David Wise ed., 2004) (noting the low level of
enrollment found absent automatic enrollment).
128. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 27.
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C. Other Theories of the Fund
Clearly the Supreme Court could enrich its fund jurisprudence by taking judicial
notice of the important distinctions between firms and funds. Moreover, if the Court were
to examine the managerial and neoclassical traditions of firm theory, 129 in addition
merely to its contractual130 predilection, the Court might be able to develop a more
satisfying intellectual conception of the investment fund.131
Not only would developing a better theory of the fund assist in the future resolution
of litigation—which is surely destined to arrive as more public governments and state
legislatures eliminate their pension plans in response to budgetary constraints—but it
might also prove a useful tool for legislatures themselves, who may wish to address the
subject either because of the broader economic growth of funds or because decisions such
as Jones and Janus have explicitly punted the resolution of such issues back to
lawmakers.132
V. CONCLUSION
After a hiatus of almost a quarter-century, the Supreme Court has again considered
the legal issues affecting investment funds, home to more than $12 trillion in U.S.
savings. In two important rulings—Jones and Janus—in two consecutive Terms, the
Court has misapplied conventional, neoclassical 133 conceptions of the firm to the
operations of funds. In so doing, the Court has produced unsatisfying and highly
formalistic opinions that bear little resemblance to the functional realities of fund
operations. Indeed, in Janus, Justice Thomas acknowledged the formalistic shortcomings
of his ruling but simply identified Congress as the ultimate authority for ameliorating any
unfortunate consequences of the ruling. 134 Of course, as with any formalistic ruling that
draws bright lines, the Janus ruling brings the possibility of great mischief if operating
companies ever choose to emulate the structure of investment funds simply to enjoy
similar immunities from Rule 10b-5 litigation. The Supreme Court must attempt to

129. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (2002) (providing an overview of these traditions).
130. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (discussing the contractual theory of the firm).
131. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1685 (1988).
132. MACEY, supra note 114.
133. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12
(1991).
134. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers exercise
significant influence over their client funds . . . it is undisputed that the corporate formalities were
observed here. JCM and Janus Investment Fund remain legally separate entities, and Janus
Investment Fund's board of trustees was more independent than the statute requires. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10[fn9]. Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in light of the close
relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is properly the responsibility of
Congress and not the courts.
Id.
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develop a far richer, more nuanced theory of how funds operate and theoretical paradigm
for their future governance. All signs suggest that massive new flows of retirement
savings and former pension funds will soon be flowing into investment funds, which is
sure to increase the flow of fund litigation throughout the federal courts. We must build a
strong and sound intellectual foundation for these structures before that flow arrives and
pours stress upon our defenses, not afterwards when the damage has already occurred.

